US Hands Off Haiti’s Democracy
A unified advocacy campaign for Haiti 2022
Individuals:
Organizations:
We call on the US to stop supporting Prime Minister Ariel Henry, and the PHTK party and its political affiliates, so that a Haitian solution to the crisis can emerge.
What role should the U.S. government (USG) play in Haiti’s current democracy crisis?
It is not appropriate for the U.S. to support a particular party or sector or to demand that Haitians take a particular path towards democracy. Haitians have the right to choose their leaders and the form of their democracy. A stable and just Haiti - which is in the interests of Haitians and the USG alike - requires that Haitians lead and own their democratic process.
What is the USG’s current role?
The U.S. has persistently supported Haiti’s current government.
Why is the USG’s current role in supporting Haiti’s current government problematic?
Haiti’s current government is dominated by the Pati Ayisyen Tèt Kale (PHTK). The PHTK was founded by President Martelly after he came to power in 2011; and along with its allies have controlled Haiti for ten of the past eleven years. The PHTK governments have systematically dismantled Haiti’s democratic institutions. Key examples include the following.
Refusal to hold fair, timely elections. Out of the thousands of elected offices required by Haiti’s Constitution, only 10 elected officials remain in office. Parliament became defunct in 2020 when most members’ terms expired - the remaining 10 senators lack quorum to act. All of Haiti’s mayors, who have a strong impact on local voting in national elections, have been illegally appointed by the PHTK executive branch. The country has not had a Prime Minister installed in accordance with constitutional requirements since 2019.
Dominating the judiciary through arbitrary arrests and dismissals of judges, appointing judges based on political opinion and failing to fill judicial vacancies, intimidation of judicial actors, and corruption. Haiti’s Supreme Court does not have a quorum to meet.
Undermining judicial proceedings. For example, when a prosecutor investigating President Moïse’s killing asked de facto PM Ariel Henry to explain multiple calls he had with a principal suspect a few hours after the killing, Henry fired the prosecutor. When the Minister of Justice protested, Henry fired him. Eight months after the assassination, not a single person has been charged in the case, and the judicial investigation has halted. Press revelations increasingly point to PHTK involvement in the killing.
Ensuring impunity for crimes against humanity, including the La Saline massacre and the assassinations of high-profile human rights defenders. This impunity has contributed to the shrinking civic space for human rights defenders, including journalists and civil society activists. It is also directly linked to Haiti’s current high rates of violence by non-state armed actors.
Attacking protestors and journalists, including through shootings, beatings, and use of chemical irritants by the Haitian police and government-allied gangs.
Encouraging and supporting gangs. Gangs - often supported by the PHTK for political purposes, with deadly consequences like the La Saline massacre - control over half the country. Kidnapping has skyrocketed, and for many Haitians going to work, school, or a store has become a life-and-death decision.
Looting the government treasury through massive corruption. The PHTK has diverted billions of dollars from vital healthcare, education, agriculture and economic development projects.
Generating inflation and currency devaluation through corruption and mismanagement. Haiti’s currency, the gourde, has depreciated over 30% against the U.S. dollar in the last year, 160% over the past decade. Inflation is over 20%. The World Food Program estimated that over 45% of Haitians faced hunger, even before the Ukraine crisis. Haiti’s economy has actually shrunk each of the last three years.
The U.S. has acknowledged the Haitian government’s complicity in several of these areas, particularly with regards to chronic impunity, gang violence, and corruption.
How has the USG propped up de facto PM Henry and the PHTK government?
The USG has been propping up the de facto PM Henry and his PHTK regime through several initiatives, including the following.
Treating the PHTK government as indispensable to any transitional agreement. This effectively hands Henry and the PHTK a veto over any transitional agreement or government, allowing them to make unreasonable demands to consolidate their power. PHTK knows that civil society actors, the political opposition, and other sectors of Haiti’s pro-democracy movement must satisfy their demands or risk the U.S. scuttling the process.
Installing PM Henry in office through an announcement by the U.S.-led “Core Group” (see below).
Facilitating former President Jovenel Moise’s remaining in office despite the expiration of his term in February 2021 through a statement of support.
Refusing to condemn or even acknowledge PHTK interference with the investigation into President Moïse’s assassination.
Refusing to condemn PHTK collaboration with gang members, despite acknowledging allegations of collusion. Although the Trump Administration did sanction three Haitians under the Global Magnitsky Act for participating in the 2018 La Saline massacre, the Biden Administration has imposed no additional sanctions, nor has it followed the Trump Administration’s critique of gang/government attacks against political opponents, protestors, and the press despite ongoing reports of government corruption and complicity with gang members.
Pledging tens of millions of dollars at a February donor conference led by the UN and the de facto Henry government. In total, donors pledged more than $600 million.
A diverse group of actors from Haitian civil society, including religious groups, women’s groups, and marginalized community groups, as well as political organizations, have come together to do the difficult work of rebuilding democratic legitimacy through a participatory and transparent process under the Accord du 30 Août (commonly known as the Montana Accord). (See No. 5 below). USG support for the PHTK allows the de facto government to act as a spoiler without undertaking meaningful efforts towards restoring participatory democracy or constructively engaging in that process, all while it itself lacks any democratic legitimacy. The U.S. needs to step away in order to actually allow a Haitian solution to emerge.
What is the Montana Accord?
The Montana Accord is the work of the Commission for the Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis, which has been working since March 2021 towards restoring democratic order in Haiti and offering a roadmap for achieving the social justice demands articulated in popular protests. In August, 2021 the Commission issued the Accord, which proposes a credible interim government that combines participation by political parties with oversight by non-partisan civil society organizations, and articulates a framework for a social justice agenda. The interim government’s primary responsibility would be developing the conditions necessary to run fair elections and holding those elections within two years, while laying the foundations for achieving a broader social transformation towards justice.
Haitians believe that if the USG stopped propping up the PHTK government, it would be forced to leave power or make meaningful concessions in negotiations. USG officials have acknowledged that the PHTK could not maintain power without U.S. support as well.
The Montana Accord has been endorsed by organizations across Haiti’s political and social spectrums, including unions, professional associations, farmers’ alliances, women’s groups, human rights organizations, diaspora, and religious organizations. It has chosen its interim Prime Minister and President according to the Accord’s mechanisms, which strive to achieve legitimacy through transparency and participation in the absence of a constitutional path forward.
In January 2022, the Montana Accord process negotiated an expanded agreement with the members of the Protocole d’Entente Nationale Modifié (PEN Modifié) (see No. 15 below), a memorandum established in July 2021 for the purpose of choosing a successor to the assassinated president and signed by representatives of 70 political parties and social groups - including PHTK members, allies, and opposition groups. The revised agreement between the Montana group and PEN Modifié replaced the Montana Accord’s single President with a five-person Presidential College, consisting of 1) the existing Montana Accord President, Fritz Jean; 2) a member named by the PEN Modifié group; 3) a member named by the current Haitian government; and 4-5) two members appointed by other civil society organizations such as the Churches and the University.
In expanding their agreement and offering equal Presidential College seats to the government, PEN Modifié, and other sectors, the diverse participants in the Montana Accord have compromised substantially on their original agreement, which was already the product of extensive negotiation and compromise. Consequently, members have made substantial sacrifices to important demands in order to reach out to potential collaborators and have repeatedly demonstrated themselves open to genuine dialogue, political compromise, and a willingness to put progress towards a stable Haiti over any personal political agenda.
Doesn’t the Biden Administration say it is already supporting Haiti-led solutions?
The Biden Administration promised that it will no longer “pick winners and losers'' in Haiti. But the administration has already picked the winners by choosing de facto PM Ariel Henry for his post. The administration is ensuring that Henry and the PHTK remain “winners” - at the expense of Haiti’s democracy - by continuing to support him.
Why is a PHTK-led solution not a genuine Haitian-led solution?
The current PHTK government was chosen by the United States, not Haitians. De facto PM Henry, a key official in previous PHTK governments, was nominated by President Moïse two days before Moïse’s July 7, 2021 assassination, but was not installed. On July 8, Ambassador Helen La Lime, a U.S. Foreign Service Officer leading the UN in Haiti, announced that the then-current PM, Claude Joseph, would remain in office. But on July 17, the “Core Group,” a group of countries dominated by the USG, announced that Ariel Henry would be the Prime Minister. In announcing Dr. Henry’s new role, the Core Group was not supporting any Haitian process for that transition; the Core Group was the transition process.
PM Henry and his PHTK government do not have constitutional legitimacy. The government was neither appointed nor confirmed through processes required by Haiti’s constitution, and is the product of a President whose term is over and of USG interference.
The PM and the PHTK government also lack popular legitimacy, as a broad swath of Haiti’s electorate and civil society rejects them. There are consistent protests demanding that the government address insecurity, impunity, and corruption, as well as survey findings showing a lack of trust in the government. A wide spectrum of Haiti’s society, including organizations representing peasants, workers, women, professional organizations, business elites, Vodouizan, Catholic and Protestant institutions, and most political parties oppose the current regime.
After the Montana Accord was published, the Henry government quickly assembled a rival accord - signed on September 11 - that would maintain its hold on power. That accord has attracted some leaders formerly associated with the opposition, but most political parties and other civil society organizations reject it. The Henry administration has not undertaken material steps to negotiate with key players like the Montana-Pen Modifié, nor offered modifications to its power-entrenching approach that might help to build consensus. Notably, a group of signatories to the September 11 accord have recently broken with Henry to open talks with the Montana-Pen Modifié group in order to find a national consensus, presumably reflecting frustration with Henry’s intransigence and explicitly in response to what the group calls “proven incompetence of the power in place” vis-a-vis Haiti’s continuing crisis.
But de facto PM Henry is in office. Shouldn’t the USG recognize that reality and work with his government?
No. Inflexible USG support for de facto PM Henry is keeping in office an illegitimate government (see above) that is directly responsible for dismantling Haiti’s democratic institutions and driving its current state of insecurity. Such support is delaying the emergence of a Haitian-led solution to the crisis, a delay that ordinary Haitians, who are subject to violence, hunger, and lethal lack of government services cannot afford.
The PHTK regime has demonstrated time and again that it does not respect the rights of Haitians and will not be part of a democratic solution. It has persistently dismantled democratic structures and in over a decade in power has not run a single election that was timely or fair. De facto PM Henry has refused to engage in meaningful, constructive discussion with civil society actors. Even allies from his September 11 accord have broken away to hold talks with Montana-Pen Modifié to try to find a national consensus while Henry remains intransigent. Expecting the PHTK to reverse a decade of consistently anti-democratic policies is insulting to Haitians.
Can the PHTK government tackle insecurity in Haiti?
De facto PM Henry and the PHTK lack the credibility and the will or competence to fight crime or insecurity, in large part due to their complicity in that crime, including especially massive corruption and gang violence. They are closely connected to gangs and international drug traffickers and have allowed gangs to flourish through incompetence, corruption, and government collaboration - something the USG acknowledged in its recent Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Haiti. Indeed, the current gang crisis has its roots in deliberate PHTK actions to rely on gang violence to reduce anti-government organizing in popular neighborhoods and to control elections. Moreover, Henry himself, as well as other PHTK-affiliated officials and individuals, are allegedly implicated in the assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse. They have overtly and persistently obstructed the related investigation
Can the PHTK government improve Haiti’s economy?
De facto PM Henry and the PHTK are a principal cause of Haiti’s economic misery; their record demonstrates that they will not contribute to an economic rebound. (See No. 3 above).
The PHTK political machine is based on looting the government treasury through massive corruption. This looting has diverted billions from vital healthcare, education, agriculture and economic development projects, depriving Haiti of the services that its people need to thrive. During the last three months of 2021, government spending was 33% lower than it had been the year prior. Public investment fell even more sharply, dropping by 73%. Henry’s de facto government has failed to adequately pay police or provide them sufficient resources, which has played a significant role in the police’s inability to manage gang violence and insecurity. Government workers in healthcare, justice and other areas have engaged in protracted strikes just to collect unpaid salaries.
Hospital workers went on strike in March 2022 due to inadequate wages and concerns about insecurity. This has meant that accessing public health resources, already challenging due to Haiti’s fragile and under-resourced public health system, has become even more difficult.
Police have been unable to respond to insecurity because they lack resources and equipment, and are outnumbered and outgunned by gangs. This has made access to protection and judicial recourse incredibly difficult.
Judicial officials initiated an indefinite strike in April 2022 to enforce the government’s promises to them, which closed down the courts.
The chronic lack of funding and resources exacerbates problems with the justice system, delaying criminal trials and preventing ordinary Haitians from accessing formal justice to resolve disputes.
What is the position of the Haitian diaspora?
Voices from the Haitian diaspora, including its political, faith, and civic organization leaders, have expressed deep concern over Haiti’s current social and political crises. Members of the diaspora hope that a solution will emerge from the chaos and are working to ensure that this solution is Haitian-led, reflecting the voices of both Haitians in Haiti and in the diaspora. This reflects a further recognition that Haitians in Haiti are the most directly affected by USG policies and engaged in Haiti’s governance, even as the diaspora both experiences the enormous impacts of the situation and has a separate claim on U.S. government actions as U.S. voters.
There are over one million first- and second-generation Haitians in the U.S. and most remain deeply connected to Haiti. For many in the diaspora, Haiti’s crisis has a personal and financial impact. They are unable to travel back to Haiti, and as the situation worsens, experience greater pressure to send more money home even as they are themselves restricted from visiting their homeland.
The critical mass of Haitian Americans in the U.S. is already affecting U.S. domestic policy in states where large communities of Haitians reside. These include Florida, Georgia, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, where Haitians play an increasingly important role in many congressional districts. While the Haitian diaspora is diverse and does not speak in a unified voice about solutions, it generally agrees that any solution requires systematic campaigns to combat corruption and impunity while promoting respect for human rights. The diaspora also generally agrees that Haiti needs free, fair, and inclusive national and municipal elections. This is something that many members of the diaspora - as well as Haitians in Haiti - believe cannot be accomplished under the Henry regime or without a meaningful political transition that addresses the structural drivers of Haiti’s democracy crisis.
What is the role of non-Haitian advocates?
Advocates for Haitians’ rights who adopt a solidarity approach believe that Haitians in Haiti and in the U.S. should lead the fight for democracy in Haiti, and that U.S. policy must respect Haitians’ rights. Solidarity advocates have many important roles to play, but understand that sustainable progress requires them to follow Haitian leadership and direction rather than seeking to promote a particular resolution.
Are U.S.-based solidarity advocates endorsing the Montana Accord?
U.S.-based solidarity advocates recognize that Haitians should control their own democracy. Many believe it is inappropriate for them, as non-Haitians, to formally endorse any particular vehicle to resolve the crisis, even as they undertake to promote voices from Haiti and its diaspora.
Solidarity advocates call for a democratic Haiti and a Haitian-led process towards that goal, which requires participation, transparency, and a meaningful investment in rebuilding government and democratic legitimacy. We do recognize that of the various processes and agreements that have been put forward towards reestablishing democratic rule in Haiti, the “Montana'' process has involved the most dialogue and participation, obtained the broadest support, and has implemented structures that would instill or safeguard participatory elements of democracy. Moreover, it is the only accord that seems to have prioritized the inclusion and participation of all the various actors, including the current regime, Haiti’s churches, the private sector, and the Haitian diaspora. The primary alternative to the Montana Accord is an accord hastily assembled by de facto PM Henry, which would keep PHTK in power, allowing it to run deeply flawed elections and continue dismantling Haiti’s democracy. Moreover, the de facto PM has proven unable to meet his commitment to his own accord, with the signatories to Henry’s accord recently expressing dissatisfaction with his refusal to keep the accord’s promises.
If the USG should not support the PHTK regime, who should it support?
Haitians are asking the Biden Administration to stop supporting the PHTK regime. They are not asking the USG to support any other party or initiative. They just want the U.S. to stop interfering, and allow a Haitian-led solution to emerge. Haitians are confident that if the international community stops interfering, they will be able to negotiate a sustainable, broad-based democratic solution to their country’s crisis. The USG should be cognizant of the fact that this may take time, and should not view time spent by Haitian civil society and other actors thinking and planning as a green light to intervene or dictate next steps.
What is PEN Modifié and why is their inclusion in the Montana Accord significant?
PEN (Protocole d’Entente Nationale) Modifié is a coalition of approximately 70 political organizations and social groups, and includes many prominent figures, including the President of Haiti’s Senate Joseph Lambert and former senator Youri Latortue. PEN Modifié was originally formed in July 2021 with the aim of choosing a successor to the assassinated president. It was signed by representatives of a wide array of political parties and social groups, including PHTK members, allies, and opposition groups.
A Political Consensus was reached between PEN Modifié and the Montana Accord in January 2022. Despite concerns regarding the inclusion in PEN Modifié of people - such as Senator Latortue - with a history of undemocratic and illegal activities, the Consensus, which largely retains the Montana Accord’s robust mechanisms for achieving free and fair elections, is generally considered a step forward because the combined initiative concentrates different power bases under a single umbrella, providing a stronger counterweight to the PHTK.
Is the Montana Accord sufficiently participatory and inclusive?
The Montana Accord has the broadest support in civil society of all the competing processes, with the best citizen participation, both in its formation and its future steps.
Some civil society actors have expressed concerns with the limitations of the Montana Accord’s outreach, especially to vulnerable populations, including rural communities and those living with marginalized identities. The Accord’s leadership has acknowledged this issue and pledged to address it, despite the challenging conditions.
Are Haitian women involved in this political transition?
Haiti’s women have historically been marginalized in politics, public and economic leadership, and public spaces and the formal economy more generally. Today, Haiti has one of the lowest rates of women’s political participation in the world (just 3% of parliamentarians were women when Haiti last had a functioning parliament, which left it ranked 186 - the fourth lowest - for women’s parliamentary participation in the world), and Haitian women face significant barriers, including threats and violence, when they try to enter civic spaces. Women’s leadership in the political transition is critical to resolving these systemic issues and providing a diverse perspective on governance. Considerable female leadership in the Commission’s initiative has made women’s rights activists in Haiti hopeful that they will have a greater role in the transition. At minimum, Haiti’s constitutional quota requiring that at least 30% of government positions be held by women must be meaningfully enforced.
Are the proposed transitional accords gender-inclusive?
The Montana Accord has made significant steps toward gender parity, while de facto PM Henry’s accord remains lacking in this respect.
The Montana Accord has substantial female leadership and includes provisions for ensuring gender parity in its entities. Women constitute 50 percent of the National Transitional Council’s leadership. At least one of the five members of the Presidential College must be a woman. The Accord document further makes a point of making explicit that all positions can be held by both women and men - a deliberate effort to promote gender inclusion and parity.
De facto PM Henry’s accord, meanwhile, mentions the 30% quota set out in the 2012 amendment to Haiti’s constitution, but has not demonstrated a commitment to reaching that requirement. In fact, de facto PM Henry’s accord only requires that one out of 33 members of its National Constituent Assembly represent the Women’s Sector.
What are the next steps for the Montana Accord?
At the time of writing, the Montana Accord had finalized its framework for pursuing a governance transition leading to free, fair, and credible elections and a roadmap for social justice reform. Its stated next steps are to continue engaging in political and social dialogue in order to build understanding of and support for the Accord, as well as to negotiate compromise adjustments with those who continue to oppose it. To that end, the Montana-PEN Modifié group reported holding a “constructive” meeting on April 11 with a group that appears to be splitting off from Henry’s September 11 Accord (see No. 7 above) and pledged to continue their dialogue. The group has further demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with de facto PM Henry but the initial meetings were inconclusive and the group is currently awaiting a response to a February 14 letter to the de facto PM, in which it asked him to confirm his wish to negotiate upon meeting certain conditions.
Why is the USG propping up the PHTK government?
The USG claims that it is no longer propping up the PHTK government (despite extensive evidence to the contrary), so it does not try to justify the policy in public. Haitians, Haitian-Americans, solidarity advocates, and members of Congress have asked administration officials for an explanation in numerous meetings, without receiving a clear response. We list several of the most likely explanations below, along with counter-arguments.
Possible USG reason 1: A belief that the alternatives to PHTK rule will require going into unknown territory that could make conditions in Haiti worse.
Rebuttal: The principal alternative to continued PHTK rule is the Montana Accord put forward by the Commission. The Accord proposes an interim government that combines participation by political parties with oversight by civil society organizations, and has been endorsed by civil society and political organizations across Haiti’s political and social spectrums. This alternative offers the closest to a democratic consensus (and offers more indicia of democratic legitimacy than continued PHTK rule) and is widely regarded as the best option moving forward.
Possible USG reason 2: Historical support for the PHTK by leading State Department officials, including Haiti Special Coordinator Ambassador Kenneth Merten and Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Michele Sison.
Rebuttal: U.S. support for the PHTK has been and continues to be deeply problematic and damaging to Haiti’s political, social and economic progress. Continuing to stubbornly support the PHTK in an effort to remain consistent will only have the effect of deepening that damage and increasing distrust in foreign intervention. The USG would do much better to acknowledge its past mistakes and shift its support toward a real Haitian-led solution.
Possible USG reason 3: Concern that the Montana Accord, although fundamentally a pro-democracy, anti-corruption grouping, could lead to the election of a left-of-center government in Haiti that would provoke criticism of the administration’s Haiti policy from Republicans in the Senate.
Rebuttal: President Biden campaigned, and won, on a promise to make human rights the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. As President he confirmed that “defending freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity” was necessary for the U.S. to confront global challenges. Abandoning the Administration's foundational principles and violating Haitians’ democratic rights simply cannot be justified, on either a moral or practical level, by fear of partisan criticism.
Who is making the call for the USG to support Henry and the PHTK?
Ultimately, USG policy on Haiti is the responsibility of President Biden. The most public face of U.S. Haiti policy right now is Ambassador Brian Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. The U.S. has no Ambassador in Haiti, because of Senate Republican refusals to hold ambassadorial confirmation votes. Former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Kenneth Merten is the Haiti Special Coordinator. Ambassador Daniel Foote was the Haiti Special Envoy, until he resigned in September in protest of continued USG support for the PHTK regime and USG treatment of Haitian migrants at the southern border. Some advocates believe that high-level domestic policy officials support the current policy for electoral reasons.
The US is still picking winners and losers in Haiti.
The U.S. government (USG) says it is supporting a Haitian-led solution to the country’s political crisis and is “no longer in the business of picking winners and losers in Haiti.” But this espoused neutrality is contradicted by USG persistence in propping up the unconstitutional, corrupt, and repressive regime of de facto Prime Minister Dr. Ariel Henry and the Pati Aysiyen Tèt Kale (PHTK) party. Haitian civil society, Haiti experts in the U.S. and members of Congress engaged with Haiti have all identified the U.S. government’s backing of Haiti’s regime as a principal impediment to resolving Haiti’s crisis. Examples include:
The U.S. government continues to provide de facto PM Henry with a veto over negotiations to solve Haiti’s political crisis, eliminating his incentive to compromise and allowing his regime to continue dismantling Haiti’s democratic institutions and repressing the opposition. The assertion that the U.S. government is not “picking winners and losers” ignores the reality that the U.S. government already picked the winner when it installed Henry as de facto Prime Minister in July 2021. Since then, the U.S. government has been preserving the corrupt and repressive status quo by publicly treating Henry as an indispensable party in negotiations and promoting his political accord over other processes with much broader support. For example, when the U.S. State Department urges Haitians to come together, it repeatedly names Dr. Henry’s de facto government as one of the parties to any agreement, despite widespread rejection of the PHTK regime by Haitian civil society. The U.S. government does not treat any other civil society actor as indispensable. The USG April 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Haiti touts a political accord Henry issued in September 2021, but makes no mention of the much broader and earlier civil society initiative with nearly a thousand signatures known as the Montana Accord (see further here, here and here). Even as it thus privileges Henry’s initiatives, the U.S. government specifically exhorts representatives from the Montana Accord to “engage in earnest discussions” with his de facto regime.
Both Dr. Henry and Haitian civil society know that USG support for Henry’s de facto regime allows him to make unreasonable demands that others must accept. Henry has, in fact, refused to negotiate in good faith or make meaningful compromises, while Haiti has plunged deeper into violence and misrule, and is no closer to fair elections than it was a year ago.
USG officials have acknowledged that they are aware of serious allegations of Henry's involvement in the assassination of President Moïse, including multiple phone calls between Henry and the alleged ringleader of the killing shortly after the assassination, yet they have declined to express corresponding concern, responding to questions from the press by citing to Henry's own bald denial and by pointing out that other political actors also have connections to nefarious actors. A judge leading the investigation was secretly recorded declaring that de facto PM Henry was part of the planning of the assassination. The U.S. government likewise refuses to publicly criticize de facto PM Henry’s obstruction of the investigation, which includes acts like firing a prosecutor and a Minister of Justice who raised concerns about Henry’s telephone calls with the assassination’s alleged mastermind; and failing to provide resources, including security, to judges and prosecutors working on the case. The U.S. Congress has sought to clarify the State Department’s understanding of interference with the investigation into the assassination, requiring the Department to submit a report to Congress by mid-June and to the public by June 30. As of July 15, 2022, the Department has failed to comply.
The Biden administration refuses to condemn the well-established links between de facto PM Henry’s regime and gang violence in Haiti that is making life unlivable for many Haitians and resulting in increasingly horrific human rights violations. The gangs’ ascendance is directly linked to PHTK support for politically-motivated gang violence, like the 2018 La Saline massacre. In 2020, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on two PHTK government officials and a police officer turned government-allied gang leader for supporting gangs that “repress political dissent in Port-au-Prince neighborhoods known to participate in anti-government demonstrations” in connection with that massacre. There has been no follow-up and no further acts by the U.S. government. The State Department’s April 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Haiti notes connections between gangs and unnamed government officials, but the Biden administration has not named or sanctioned any of these individuals. Nor has the administration criticized the PHTK regime for its gang ties, despite evidence and credible allegations that the regime finances gang members, supplies them with guns and ammunition, and interferes with their prosecution (for example, a human rights group reported that PM Henry’s top advisors successfully intervened with police to release members of the 400 Mawozo gang from prison). On June 27, law school clinics at NYU, Harvard, and Yale, which work on human rights in Haiti, denounced the “United States’ continued support for de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry despite strong evidence of his government’s involvement in this violence.”
The U.S. government invited de facto PM Henry to participate among heads of state in the Summit of the Americas, which the United States hosted in June, despite adopting a policy of excluding “undemocratic” governments. By contrast, the State Department wielded the policy to exclude the leaders of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, ignoring the pervasively undemocratic nature of Haiti’s rulers.
The U.S. government offered Henry unqualified recognition as a head of state when it pledged USD 50 million at a February 2022 donor conference. The de facto Henry regime was invited to co-lead the conference alongside the UN with no reservations as to its democratic and human rights record or to its authority to do so. In a recent OpEd, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols further noted that the U.S. government has quadrupled its security assistance to Haiti. The State Department’s statement from a June 12 International Partners Ministerial Meeting on Haiti describes extensive U.S. investments in Haiti, but does not mention concerns with the Henry regime’s legitimacy, repression or corruption.
What is the U.S. Congress doing?
Members of the U.S. Congress have consistently opposed USG support for the PHTK regime and its blocking of a Haitian-led solution to the crisis. Leadership on this has come from members of the House Haiti Caucus, of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Congressional Black Caucus. Congressional advocacy on Haiti has included the below.
The Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act in the most recent Consolidated Appropriations Act (see below for details).
The October 7, 2021 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, in which Ambassador Foote strongly condemned U.S. expulsions of Haitian migrants as well as the USG’s persistent support for Haiti’s ruling PHTK party.
The February 7, 2021 letter from Congresspersons Andy Levin, Gregory Meeks, and Yvette Clarke, and four other members of Congress to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, urging the U.S. to condemn President Moïse’s anti-democratic actions and support a transitional government in Haiti.
The April 26, 2021 letter from Representatives Gregory Meeks and Hakeem Jeffries (and signed by 68 members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee) to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, calling on the U.S. to withhold funding for President Moïse’s proposed constitutional referendum and warning of the dangers of pushing for flawed elections.
The August 9, 2021 letter led by Senators Marco Rubio and Bob Menendez and joined by a bipartisan group of Senators to President Biden, expressing concern with insecurity in Haiti following the assassination of President Moïse.
The February 16, 2022 letter from over 100 Democratic members of Congress to President Biden, calling on him to address “disparate and often inhumane treatment” of Haitian migrants at the southern border and the mass deportations, particularly given the ongoing crisis in Haiti.
The March 16, 2022 letter from Congresspersons Ayanna Pressley and Mondaire Jones to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Director Rochelle Walensky, calling on them to end Title 42 and end mass deportations of Haitian migrants, in response to the Biden Administration’s decision to suspend deportation flights to Ukraine in light of the humanitarian crisis there. Their letter noted that the administration had deported over 20,000 Haitians despite the ongoing political and security crisis in Haiti.
The March 17, 2022 letter from seven Congresspersons, calling on the U.S. to withdraw support for Haiti's de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry and instead support Haitian efforts to establish a transitional government. The letter noted that Henry lacks legitimacy to resolve Haiti’s political crisis.